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that revocation of petitioner's license to dispense controlled 
substances is tantamount to depriving him of his lifetime 
profession for dispensing therapeutic doses of drugs to one, long 
time customer who was entitled to the drugs by physicians' 
diagnosis and oral approval of refills. The order is thus 
arbitrary and capricious particularly when compared to penalties 
imposed in other cases involving licensed pharmacists. Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) (Supp. 1991), the appellate 
court must grant relief if the agency action is contrary to the 
agency's prior practice, and substantially prejudices the party 
seeking judicial review, unless the agency demonstrates a fair 
and rational basis for the inconsistency. 
2. The Director was present at the proceedings and 
participated in the examination of the petitioner. Thus, the 
Director was an advocate, not a tribunal, and Petitioner was 
deprived of due process of law. Constitutional questions are 
characterized as questions of law to which a correction-of-error 
standard of review applies giving no deference to the agency's 
decision. See Ouestar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n.. 
817 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1991). 
3. The findings were not signed by the presiding officer, 
who was the ALJ designated to conduct the proceeding, as required 
by Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-10(l) (1988). The Director, who 
was neither the presiding officer nor the agency head, signed the 
Order adopting the findings. This is a question of law to which 
a correction-of-error standard applies. See Morton Intern. Inc. 
2 
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v. Auditing Pi v.. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
4. No concurrence of the State Board of Pharmacy was 
obtained as required by Utah Code Annotated § 58-1-16 (1988), 
although two members of the Board appeared to submit the 
findings, conclusions and recommended order. This is a question 
of law to which a correction-of-error standard applies. See 
Morton, 814 P.2d at 585. 
STATUTES 
The following Utah Code Annotated statutes are relevant to 
the consideration of this appeal. 
58-1-16 Notice of disciplinary action — Hearing officers 
— Director's powers — Evidence. 
(1) (a) Before suspending, revoking, placing on 
probation, or refusing to renew a license, and before 
issuing a cease and desist order, the division shall 
comply with the procedures and requirements of Title 
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act; 
however, before proceeding under the provisions of 
Section 63-46b-20, providing for emergency adjudicative 
proceedings, the division shall review the proposed 
action with a committee of licensees appointed by the 
licensing board established under this title for the 
profession of the person against whom the action is 
proposed. 
(b) By complying with the procedures and 
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, the director may 
hold or cause to be held administrative hearings 
regarding any other matter affecting the division or 
the activities of any person authorized to practice his 
occupation or profession under this title. 
(2) (a) All adjudicative proceedings shall be held 
before an appropriate presiding officer, as designated 
by the director. 
(b) The presiding officer shall make written 
recommendations for action, findings of fact, and 
conclusions of law. 
3 
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(c) The director, with the concurrence of the 
appropriate board, may issue a written order based on 
the recommendations but is not bound to follow the 
recommendations of the presiding officer. 
(d) If the director does not issue an order within 
ten days after the presiding officer has made the 
recommendations, the recommendations of the presiding 
officer shall become the order. 
(3) (a) The director or his designee may administer 
oaths, issue subpoenas, and compel the attendance of 
witnesses and the production of papers, books, 
accounts, documents, and evidence. 
(b) Any party to any action permitted under this 
section may issue subpoenas and compel the attendance 
of witnesses and the production of papers, books, 
accounts, documents, and evidence. 
63-46b-2. Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
. . . 
(c) "Agency head" means an individual or body of 
individuals in whom the ultimate legal authority of the 
agency is vested by statute. 
. . . 
(h) (i) "Presiding officer" means an agency head, 
or an individual or body of individuals designated 
by the agency head, by the agency's rules, or by 
statute to conduct an adjudicative proceeding. 
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not 
compromised, an agency may substitute one 
presiding officer for another during any 
proceeding. 
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding officer 
at one phase of a proceeding need not continue as 
presiding officer through all phases of a 
proceeding. 
63-46b-10(l) 
In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or 
after the filing of any post-hearing papers permitted 
by the presiding officer, or within the time required 
by any applicable statute or rule of the agency, the 
4 
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presiding officer shall sign and issue an order that 
includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's 
findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence 
of record in the adjudicative proceedings or on 
facts officially noted; 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's 
conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the 
presiding officer's decision; 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the 
agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for 
reconsideration; 
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or 
judicial review of the order available to 
aggrieved parties; 
13-1-12. Order by hearing officer or body — Appeals 
of order to the division director or the 
executive director. 
(1) (a) At the close of an adjudicative proceeding, 
the administrative law judge or an occupational board 
or representative committee with assistance from the 
administrative law judge, shall issue an order. 
(b) The order may be appealed to the executive 
director or the division director for review. 
(2) If a division director is unable for any reason to 
fairly review or rule upon an order of the 
administrative law judge or a board or committee, the 
executive director shall review and rule upon the 
order. 
63-46b-16. Judicial review - Formal adjudicative 
Proceedings. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful 
procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to 
5 
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follow prescribed procedure; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, 
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by 
giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair 
and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing of the 
Department of Commerce commenced proceedings against the 
Petitioner, Pickett, by "Notice of Agency Action" to impose 
"appropriate sanctions" against Pickett for alleged violations of 
the licensing act and statutes related to dispensing controlled 
substances. After a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, 
the division issued orders revoking Pickett's license to dispense 
controlled substances and requiring Servus Drug Co. to employ 
another pharmacist to deal with controlled substances. Pickett 
appealed the order to the Executive Director, who affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A "Notice of Agency Action" was served upon Pickett 
notifying him that he was entitled to a hearing and that "The 
presiding officer at the hearing will be J. Steven Eklund, 
Administrative Law Judge, Department of Commerce." (R 67). 
Present at the hearing on May 26, 1992, were the ALJ and two 
members of the State Board of Pharmacy. Three remaining members 
of the Board were absent. David E. Robinson, the Director of the 
6 
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Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing was present. 
(R 35). 
The Board's unsigned Findings of Fact are as follows (R 36-
37) : 
1. Respondent Jack W. Pickett (Hereinafter, 
Respondent) is, and at all times relevant to this 
proceeding has been, licensed to practice as a 
pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances in the 
State of Utah. Respondent has been a licensed 
pharmacist since approximately 1954. Respondent Servus 
Drug Co. (hereinafter, Servus Drug Co.) is, and at all 
times relevant to this proceeding has been, licensed as 
a pharmacy and a dispensary for controlled substances 
in the State of Utah. This record does not reflect the 
exact date those licenses were issued. Respondent is 
employed by Servus Drug Co., a business which is owned 
by Respondent's wife. 
2. On twelve occasions between May 20, 1991 and 
July 30, 1991, Respondent dispensed various dosages of 
either Tranxene, a Schedule IV controlled substance, 
[or] Esgic, a Schedule III controlled 
substance, without a physician's authorization to do 
so. On occasions, Respondent dispensed medications in 
either unlabeled prescription vials or a paper bag 
bearing no labels or instructions. 
3. There is a lack of sufficient evidence 
Respondent made false or forged prescriptions as to 
dispense the above-stated controlled substances or 
other medications. Further, there is a lack of 
sufficient evidence to conclude Respondent knew Mr. 
Schriver was drug dependent. Respondent acknowledges 
his prescriptive practices were improper and he failed 
to adequately document the controlled substances or 
other medications which he dispensed. Respondent often 
dispensed those controlled substances or other 
medications in the manner requested by Mr. Schriver, 
who often suggested the use of either unlabeled vials 
or other inappropriate containers. 
4. There is no substantial evidence Respondent 
has improperly dispensed controlled substances or other 
medications to other individuals. Respondent asserts 
he has taken remedial measures to address the 
acknowledged deficiencies in his practices now under 
review. However, there is a lack of substantial 
evidence as the specific nature of corrective measures 
7 
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Respondent may have undertaken in that regard. 
Pickett testified at the hearing responding to questions of 
his counsel; cross examination by Ms. Welch, respondent's 
counsel; answered questions of a Board Member; the ALJ; and then 
the Director of the Division, Mr. Robinson aggressively 
interrogated Pickett (Tr 2). Since petitioners challenge the 
propriety of the participation by the Director, we copy herein 
the questions and answer resulting from examination by the 
Director (Tr 20-33): 
THE COURT: Mr. R o b i n s o n ? 
E X A M I N A T I O N 
BY MR. ROBINSON: 
Q. Mr. Pickett, my name is David Robinson. I'm 
the director of the Division. I'm not a pharmacist, so 
my questions come from not being a pharmacist. 
MR. ROBINSON: Does he have a copy of this 
document (indicating)? 
MS. WELCH: That's correct. 
Q. (By Mr. Robinson) Look at this document, the 
stipulation. I'd like to ask you some questions about 
it. 
A. Okay. 
Q. On the bottom of Page 1 it says, on or about 
May 20th, 1991, you dispensed 30 doses of Tranxene, a 
Schedule 4 substance, to Todd Schryver. Was there a 
prescription for that drug? 
A. Originally there was. 
Q. What was that original prescription? 
A. I would have to go back on my records. 
Q. What's your recollection? 
A. I would say within six months. 
Q. On May the 25th — on Page 2, it says, on May 
the 25th, 1991, he came in again for Tranxene and you 
forged a prescription. 
A. No. That was — that's a case of updating. 
In other words — I don't see the reason they put 
forging there, it's because I didn't have prior 
approval. 
Q. Was there — did you create a document? 
A. Well, what you have to do is that after the 
prescription has been filled for certain length of time 
8 
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or a number of times, you got to update your record. 
Q. How did you update the record? What did you 
do? 
A. What you do is — 
Q. Are we talking about a computer record or are 
we talking about a paper record? 
A. Written record. 
Q. So what did you do to create a record to 
support this? Did you fill out a prescription for him? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. And you signed the doctor's name to it? 
A. Just the same as if it had been phoned in. 
Q. And you did not talk with the doctor? 
A. No, not until afterwards. That's my problem. 
These were okayed afterwards. 
Q. What is Tranxene for, what kind of drug? 
A. He was using it for anxiety. That's the 
mildest form of it. 
Q. And what was his diagnosis? 
A. That was what it was diagnosed for, was 
anxiety. 
Q. Did you see the medical record? 
A. No. But that's what he told me. 
Q. He told you that? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. The physician didn't tell you? 
A. No. 
Q. He told you? 
A. He told me that. 
Q. Do you always rely upon what your patients 
tell you? 
A. You just about have to. 
Q. On June the 14th, 1991 — well, let me ask you 
a question. On May the 20th you gave him 30 doses of 
Tranxene. Do you remember what he was — what his 
dosage was, how much? 
A. Three times a day. 
Q. Three times a day. Five days later when he 
should have taken 15 doses you gave him 30 more? 
A. I think that was when he wanted to go to Bear 
Lake. I think that was the time. I think that's the 
only time. 
Q. How long was he going to go to Bear Lake? 
A. He was going to be gone a week. 
Q. He already had a five-day supply unused, 
didn't he? 
A. Yeah. But that's less than a week. 
Q. On June the 14th, 1991, you gave him 30 doses 
of Esgic without a physician's order to do so. Why was 
that? I mean, you had no prescription for Esgic. What 
was his diagnosis? 
A. Again, he had had a prescription. 
9 
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Q. How long? 
A. Probably on that one probably for — oh, maybe 
two years previously he had. 
Q. Two years previously to that he had had a 
prescription? 
A. He'd seen the doctor in the meantime, and each 
time — 
Q. How do you know? Did he tell you? 
A. No, When we're working quite closely with the 
doctors, we pretty well know when they go in. He went 
for anxiety in the meantime, so he had to see him then. 
Q. What's Esgic for? 
A. It's just for pain. 
Q. And what was the pain caused by? 
A. He complained of backache. 
Q. Complained of backache? 
A. Un-huh (affirmative). 
Q. And you gave him 30 doses on June 14th. What 
was his — how much was he to take each day? 
A. Three times a day. 
Q. Three times a day. And yet he didn't fill 
that again until July 5th for 30 doses. He would have 
used those 30 doses of Esgic in ten days. So on June 
the 24th he would have been without Esgic, right? 
A. If he were using it properly. 
Q. If he were using the prescribed doses; is that 
right? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. June the 24th. And yet he didn't come back to 
you for 11 days later. Tell me, Mr. Pickett, does that 
suggest to you that he may have been getting his drugs 
some other place. 
A. No, not at all. 
Q. Did you ever think about that? 
A. No, because people do that all the time. 
Q. Was it possible that he was getting drugs from 
another source? 
A. Things are always possible, but not — 
Q. Do you know for sure he was not? 
A. No. I know for sure, as far as my knowledge 
is concerned, he was not. 
Q. Mr. Pickett, when you look at this pattern of 
you supplying him drugs and you look at the daily doses 
he was to be taking, do you see a discrepancy here, 
showing that either he went too long or he went too 
short? 
A. No, because we run into that all the time 
especially on paid medication. 
Q. If you look at this pattern and you calculate 
the number of doses he was to take of the drug and you 
look at the frequency with which he filled them, have 
you noticed the fact that they don't necessarily follow 
10 
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a pattern, sometimes they're longer and sometimes 
they're shorter, have you noticed that? 
A. Yes. But people with pain medication or 
backache do that. In other words, they don't use it 
every day. When they need it, they use it. When they 
don't, they don't. 
Q. On July 15th he comes to you and gets 30 doses 
of Soma. What's Soma for? 
A. That's a muscle relaxant for the back. 
Q. That's a relaxant? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. And that again was without a physician's 
order? 
A. That was the same type of situation 
originally. 
Q. Two years? 
A. Originally they had prescribed a hundred at a 
time. 
Q. How long ago? 
A. Well, they gave him that before they gave him 
the Esgic. 
Q. So it was more than two years? 
A. Well, originally it could have been more than 
two years. 
Q. How old is Mr. Schryver? 
A. Oh, 30, 35 — about 30, 35, somewhere in that 
vicinity. 
Q. Does he work? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). He's working. 
Q. Was this paid for by insurance or by him, 
personally? 
A. No, by him personally. In fact, most the time 
it was charged. 
Q. Mr. Pickett, when Ms. Welch asked you the 
question — she asked you the question, what was the 
risk? Do you remember your answer to that? What was 
the risk of dispensing these drugs without a 
prescription? Do you remember your answer? 
A. Always the possibility of someone running into 
problems. 
Q. That wasn't your first answer. What was your 
first response? 
A. No, I don't remember it. 
Q. Your first response was not to the patient's 
welfare at all, your response was that — you said that 
the doctor will say no. That was your first view of 
the risk, that the doctor would say no and you'd be 
hung out to dry. Not of the patient's welfare, that 
was not the first thought that came to your mind. Is 
that curious? 
A. You're always taught to take care of Number 
One. 
11 
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Q. You first? 
A. Who's Number One? 
Q. When Ms. Welch asked you the question about 
your continuing education, you indicated that you had 
made no attempts to remain current with continuing 
professional education, and then you said, quote, they, 
referring to the pharmacy association and the state, 
they haven't done a good job in keeping us up to date. 
A. On state law, that's true. 
Q. Is that our responsibility to keep you advised 
of the law? 
A. No, it isn't your responsibility. 
Q. Whose is it? 
A. The think is, when — 
Q. Whose is it? 
A. When the legislature meets, it's impossible to 
keep track of the changes that occur, and they should 
advise you of the changes, the pharmacy board should, 
or the state board of pharmacy should, advise you of 
those changes. There's no education system within the 
state or within the pharmacy that keeps you up to date 
on that. 
Q. What's your responsibility to go to — how 
long since you've been to State Pharmacy Association 
meeting? 
A. Quite some time. 
Q. Are you aware of any education classes they 
conduct at those meetings? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). Yeah. 
Q. Would that be a good place to become informed? 
A. Probably. Probably. 
Q. Did you feel any need to do that? 
A. Well, when you're working the store alone and 
with no relief help, it's about impossible to attend 
meetings. 
Q. When we began this, you talked about your — 
you did this to service your customer. How long have 
you been at Servus Drug? 
A. Close to 20 years. 
Q. Twenty years ago at Servus Drug were you one 
of the primary prescription fillers in the city of 
Bountiful? 
A. Not quite, not quite. There were quite a — 
there were a number. 
Q. That's changed dramatically over the years 
with the introduction of Smith's, Albertson's, and 
Shopko. 
A. Oh, sure. 
Q. And that's had an impact on your business. 
A. Sure. 
Q. How much has the fact that these chains have 
come in and those large stores comes in and impact your 
12 
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business, how much did that play in your decision to 
try to give these products to Mr. Schryver without the 
necessary protections, simply because you were 
competing and you were feeling the competition? 
A. I don't think that was a problem. I never 
considered it that way. I've always considered right 
from the start to be as much a service as we can to our 
customers. 
Q. Even if it means violating the law? 
A. We haven't. The law enforcement has varied. 
Q. Well, Mr. Pickett, you were charged with a 
felony, weren't you? 
A. Yes. But that was mainly — 
Q. And you plead guilty to a felony — or no 
contest? 
A. I didn't plead guilty, that's no contest. 
Q. Is that different than a plea of guilty? 
MR. FADEL: May I intervene? The diversion 
agreement is not a conviction, it's an agreement that 
they would set aside the information and the indictment 
if he met the conditions of the diversion agreement. 
So it's true he was charged with a felony, he made no 
plea to it, and it's not considered a conviction. I'll 
just read briefly from the statute that says that 
diversion is not a conviction. And if the case is 
dismissed, the matter should be treated as if the 
charge had never been filed. 
MS. WELCH: And that was the penal code section 
772-2 on subsequent 772-8. 
MR. ROBINSON: Ms. Welch, I'm not sure the Board 
and the Division would consider it as though the charge 
had never been filed, that may be for future criminal 
reference. I don't think the Board and the Division 
would do so and consider it a fact in argument. We 
commonly refer to the fact equating a no contest plea, 
a guilty — equal to a guilty plea. 
MS. WELCH: Well, my understanding is a nolo 
contendere plea is equal to no criminal liability, but 
it does create that civil admission. 
MR. ROBINSON: Let me go on, if I can. 
Q. (By Mr. Robinson) You refer to a Dr. Guymon. 
Who is Dr. Guymon? 
A. Guymon. G-U-Y- — 
Q. Okay. I have that. 
MR. WHITE: Guymon and Clark. 
MR. ROBINSON: Your Honor, one of the things that 
troubles me, as I hear Mr. Pickett, is that I'm not 
sure that he understands the significance of what's 
been done here. 
THE COURT: Well, the ~ 
MR. ROBINSON: The reason I ask that is I have a 
couple of exhibits that I think would be helpful to him 
13 
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that I don't think bear on the action that would be 
taken in this case. It might be helpful to him in this 
matter if I could use them, but I would look to your 
direction* 
THE COURT: Well, you say they don't bear on the 
action to be taken in this case. 
MR. ROBINSON: They don't bear, I don't think, on 
anything that the Board would recommend. 
THE COURT: What would they — why would we be 
making reference to these? 
MR. ROBINSON: Because of the fact that doctor — 
or Mr. Pickett has said that he, in response to my 
questions, doesn't — has not considered at all the 
obtaining of drugs from another source and the affect 
that that might have upon a patient. 
THE COURT: What do you intend to offer? What's 
the nature of what it is you want to present? 
MR. ROBINSON: I would like to show him some 
examples of similar cases and the affect of those 
cases. 
THE WITNESS: Let me put it this way, too. When 
that happens, you see evidence of it from the person. 
You see that he's slurring his words, you see that he's 
having difficulty walking, you see it in his 
coordination. 
Q. (By Mr. Robinson) Do addicts always appear 
that way? 
A. I've never known one that hasn't, unless 
they've had enough time between when they have taken 
something and when they see you. 
MR. ROBINSON: I'll withdraw my suggestion. 
Mr. Robinson continued his examination following 
questions by the ALJ and the answer of Pickett that 
"Apparently he (Schryver) was getting drugs somewhere 
else." (Tr 34-35). 
BY MR. ROBINSON: 
Q. He was? 
A. Apparently so. 
Q. Why do you say that? 
A. Well, it's on the information I have here that 
says he was using Darvocet. I've never dispensed 
Darvocet to him. 
Q. Paragraph 8 on Page 7 of this petition starts 
with the sentence, because Respondent dispensed 
controlled substances to a drug dependent person. 
You're telling me you didn't have any reason to believe 
he was drug dependent? 
14 
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A. No, I did not. 
Q. So you're not making an admission here — 
A, No. 
Q. — that you thought he was? 
A. No, not at all. 
Q. You don't know whether he is? 
A. Other than the fact that they told me about 
him when they came in. 
Q. "They" who? 
A. Mr. Prisk. 
THE WITNESS: And who was with you? Was the 
narcotic with you? 
MR. PRISK: Nick Sweat. 
THE WITNESS: Oh, yes, there he is. 
THE COURT: So from other sources you've been 
told? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Perhaps not on your observation of Mr. 
Schryver - THE WITNESS: No. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The order was not justified by the findings of fact in that 
revocation of Pickett's license to dispense controlled substances 
is tantamount to depriving him of his lifetime profession for 
dispensing therapeutic doses of drugs to one, long-time customer 
who was entitled to the drugs by physicians' diagnosis and oral 
approval of refills. The order is thus arbitrary and capricious 
particularly when compared to penalties imposed in other cases 
involving licensed pharmacists. 
The Director who signed the Order, was present at the 
proceedings and participated in the examination of the 
petitioner. Therefore, the Director was an advocate, not a 
tribunal, and Pickett was deprived of due process. 
The presence and participation of the Director unduly 
influenced the findings, conclusions and recommended order. 
15 
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The findings were not made and signed by the presiding 
officer who was the ALJ designated to conduct the proceeding as 
required by Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-10(l) (1988), they 
appear to have been unsigned Findings, Conclusions &. 
Recommendations of the Board. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AGENCY ACTION OF REVOCATION IS CONTRARY TO THE 
AGENCY'S PRIOR PRACTICE AND IS DISCRIMINATORY, ARBITRARY, 
AND CAPRICIOUS. 
The standard of review of the final action of the Agency is 
set forth in the statute creating review of formal adjudicative 
proceedings of administrative agencies. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(e) and (h) (1988) state that the appellate court 
shall grant relief where upon the record it is determined that 
the person seeking review has been substantially prejudiced by 
unlawful procedure, abuse of discretion or where the agency 
action is otherwise arbitrary or capricious. See D.B. v. Div. of 
Occupational Pro. Licensing. 779 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Utah App. 
1989). 
A. Unlawful Procedure 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16(2)(a) (1988) provides that all 
adjudicative proceedings shall be held before an appropriate 
presiding officer, as designated by the director. "Presiding 
officer" is defined in § 63-46b-2(h) as "an agency head or an 
individual or body of individuals designated by the agency head 
. . . to conduct an adjudicative proceeding." "Agency head" is 
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defined as the individual in "whom the ultimate legal authority 
of the agency is vested by statute." Utah Code Ann. § 13-1-2 
(Supp. 1990) creates a Department of Commerce with six divisions, 
one of which is the Division of Occupational and Professional 
licensing. The Department of Commerce is stated to be under the 
supervision, direction and control of the executive director of 
commerce who is therefore, apparently the "Agency head". Utah 
Code Ann. § 13-1-3 (Supp. 1990) and 58-1-2 (1989). The director 
of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
("Division") is appointed by the executive director, Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-1-4 (1985), who is also responsible to appoint a board 
of five persons for each profession or occupation licensed, a 
majority of whom constitute a quorum. Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-7 
(1985). 
In this case the agency failed to follow proper procedure 
and thereby substantially prejudiced Pickett. The "Notice of 
Agency Action" designated J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law 
Judge, Department of Commerce as the presiding officer (R 67). 
The presiding officer is responsible for signing and issuing an 
order which includes his findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
reasons for his decision, relief ordered by the agency, and 
information of the right for administrative or judicial review. 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-10 (1988). In the Pickett case, 
there were two board members present with the ALJ and Director 
Robinson. Pickett consented to a hearing with only two board 
members but did not waive consideration by a quorum of the board 
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(R 35). The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law And Recommended 
Order were recited as being "By The Board" but were issued 
unsigned (R 35-43). The Order revoking Pickett's license was 
signed by the division director, Robinson, wherein he adopted the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law And Recommended Order 
attached to his Order. This appears to be contrary to the 
requirements of § 63-46b-10 which places responsibility upon the 
ALJ as presiding officer to sign the findings and order. In 
absence of signing by the ALJ there is no record proof that the 
findings and order were not solely those of the division director 
who was neither authorized by law, nor by reason of his 
adversarial activity, entitled to usurp the statutory authority 
vested in the "presiding officer." Pickett filed a "Request For 
Review of Agency Action" and alleged therein as grounds for 
review that the findings and order were not signed by the 
presiding officer; the presence of the Director and his position 
as an advocate rather than as an impartial tribunal deprived 
Pickett of due process; and the presence and participation of the 
director unduly influenced the order (R 32). 
B. Due Process 
As stated in 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 855 (1979) 
due process requires that the tribunal be a fair and impartial 
one, and this requirement also applies to administrative 
hearings. The United States Supreme Court in Withron v. Larkin, 
421 U.S. 35, 43 L. Ed. 2d. 712, 95 S. Ct. 1256 (1975), held that 
a state board, which conducted preliminary investigative 
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proceedings against a physician to revoke his license, was not 
precluded from conducting a subsequent adjudicative hearing, in 
absence of specific foundation that the board was prejudiced by 
its investigation to the extent it would impugn the board's 
fairness at a later adversary hearing. See Id., 421 U.S. at 55. 
However the Court did state that: 
Clearly, if the initial view of the facts based on the 
evidence derived from nonadversarial processes as a 
practical or legal matter foreclosed fair and effective 
consideration at a subsequent adversary hearing leading 
to ultimate decision, a substantial due process 
question would be raised. 
Id. at 58. 
The Court's footnoted comment also cited Supreme Court cases 
which held that when review of an initial decision is mandated, 
the decision maker must be other than the one who made the 
decision under review. The agency head, Executive Director 
Buhler, review the Order signed by the division director, 
Robinson, and upheld the Order of his appointee division 
director, in its entirety without further hearing or independent 
consideration (R 8). This amounts to a decision maker evaluating 
his own prior decisions. An impartial independent reviewer may 
have been more inclined to modify the penalty to one more fitting 
to the Pickett defaults which were essentially harmless 
negligence in distributing tranquilizers to one, long-time 
customer who had a prescription and verbal refill orders from 
physicians. 
C. Penalty is Discriminatory, Arbitrary and Capricious 
The Executive Director, Buhler, adopted the Findings of Fact 
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of the "Board" (R 2). The findings as reviewed above and as 
recited by the Executive Director were that on twelve occasions 
Pickett dispensed prescription drugs without a physician's 
advance authorization or without proper labels, to one customer 
(R 2-3). Pickett does not dispute the facts set forth in the 
Findings of Facts. Pickett cites as error the penalties imposed 
as set forth in the Conclusion of Law and the Order of revocation 
as being discriminatory when compared to penalties recorded in 
previous Agency actions as summarized by Pickett (R 10-12): 
1. Case: William Edmund Leatherwood #OPL-86-72. 
Leatherwood and Hyland Drug admitted that from June 1985 to 
June 1986, he repeatedly sold controlled substances without a 
valid physician prescription and repeatedly signed prescription 
forms for the files, and falsely represented that a physician 
authorized the same. 
Penalty: Two year suspension and five years probation, 
which was amended by the Board following a hearing on October 28, 
1987, terminating the suspension. 
2. Case: Richard Ernest Lee #OPL-89-39. 
Lee continued to dispense prescription drugs while on 
suspension. 
Penalty: Revocation held in abeyance in favor of one-year 
suspension and probation. Supervision terminated before 
expiration of one year. 
3. Case: H. John March #OPL-88-78. 
March distributed cocaine to practitioners without 
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documenting transfer on DEA Order Forms between 1982 and 1987; he 
also acknowledged some 20 other violations including one third 
degree felony of forged prescription for a controlled substance. 
Penalty: License suspended for 70 days and denied ability 
to dispense drugs or have access to drugs, but could work 
otherwise as a pharmacist. 
4. Case: Robert Riches Hunter #OPL-88-29. 
Hunter admitted having over billed Medicaid for 
prescriptions on 12 occasions for three different customers, and 
pleaded "no contest" to Medicaid fraud, a class B misdemeanor. 
Penalty: Probation which was terminated 14 months later. 
5. Case: Donald Albert Truman, et al. #OPL-88-41. 
Respondents dispensed 3,964 doses of Fiorinal to one 
customer over an 18 month period, many of which were unauthorized 
refills. 
Penalty: Three years probation. 
6. Case: Bruce Alan Danianovich #OPL-86-13. 
Respondent brought doses of Tiunol, Ritalin, Numbutal, Opium 
and Cocaine from a pharmacy in New Mexico to his residence in 
Utah and distributed them to a person to sell to the public. He 
entered pleas of guilty to two Class A misdemeanors. 
Penalty: License suspended for three months. 
7. Case: Jimmie N. Anderson #OPL-87-113. 
Respondent dispensed Tylenol #3 to a customer without 
physicians authorization on 35 occasions and using fictitious 
prescriptions. He entered a guilty plea in federal court for 
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unlawful distribution of a controlled substance. 
Penalty: One year probation. 
8. Case: Dale D. Bainf et al. #OPL-89-26. 
Respondents made false medicaid claims and entered pleas of 
guilty to a Class B Misdemeanor. 
Penalty: Probation 10 months. 
9. Case: Randy T. Tippetts #OPL-88-79. 
Tippetts personally used Didrex from store inventory which 
was discovered during audits in 1988 showing 2,124 tablets 
missing from inventory. Tippetts acknowledged a drug problem. 
Penalty: 6 months suspension, with 3 months stayed; 5 years 
probation. 
10. Case: Clyde Hans Nielsen #OPL-87-82. 
Nielsen on several occasions dispenses Limbitrol, Zyloprin, 
Soma, Elavil and Darvacet to two different customers without 
practitioners's authorization to do so, and in three instances 
created false prescriptions. 
Penalty: Three years probation. 
Addressing Pickett's claim that the revocation penalty was 
too severe, the Executive Director wrote: (R 5-6) 
Respondent points out certain factors in Respondent's 
favor: 
a. Pharmacy is Respondent's lifetime profession; 
b. He was adjudged to have dispensed improperly 
only to one long-time customer, who arguably had oral 
approval from a physician for the refills; 
c. The penalty is more severe than penalties in 
other cases. 
The Executive Director then referred to the cases cited by 
Pickett which the Agency had previously brought against other 
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pharmacists with penalties which were less than revocation and 
noted that the cases were somewhat old, the most recent being 
three years old. He then briefly referred to other cases not 
cited by Pickett: a 1985, indefinite suspension by stipulation; a 
1986 default revocation of a pharmacist; and a 1988 case of a 
pharmacist's license suspended by stipulation. The Executive 
Director then stated: "Finally, where the Board, the 
Administrative Law Judge and Director were present at the 
hearing, heard the testimony and were able to observe the 
Respondent's demeanor, and found that restrictions were necessary 
to protect the public health, safety and welfare, the sanction 
should not be overturned or modified unless a compelling reason 
can be demonstrated." (R 7). 
Demeanor may be of some value in assessing truth of 
statements in preparation of Findings of Fact, although in some 
instances observation of demeanor, or a person whose appearance 
does not impress a finder favorably, results in unfair 
discrimination. There should have been nothing in the 
observation of demeanor that should have bolstered the penalty 
above that which the written findings would suggest. The written 
findings related to one customer possessing a prescription for 
tranquilizers, non-hardcore drugs, which were refilled mostly 
with oral approval of the physician at one clinic. It is 
difficult to imagine that observation of Pickett's demeanor, in 
testifying as set forth in the transcript, could be so construed 
as to justify revocation "to protect the public health, safety 
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and welfare." The "Board Finding" essentially negated public 
harm in paragraph 4 of its findings: 
4. There is no substantial evidence Respondent has 
improperly dispensed controlled substances or other 
medications to other individuals. Respondent assets he 
has taken remedial measures to address the acknowledged 
deficiencies in his practices now under review. 
However, there is a lack of substantial evidence as to 
the specific nature of corrective measures Respondent 
may have undertaken in that regard." 
(R 37). 
To be upheld on appeal, where the agency action is contrary 
to the agency's prior practice, the agency must justify "the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair 
and rational basis for the inconsistency." A reference to 
Pickett's demeanor is not sufficient justification for the 
penalty imposed. 
II. THERE WAS NO BOARD CONCURRENCE WITH THE DIRECTOR'S 
WRITTEN ORDER. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16(2)(c) (1988) requires concurrence 
with the "appropriate board" of the director's written order: 
(c) The director, with the concurrence of the 
appropriate board, may issue a written order based on 
the recommendations (of the presiding officer) but is 
not bound to follow the recommendations of the 
presiding officer. 
Neither the Order of the Executive Director dated July 30, 1992 
(R 8) nor the Order of the director of the division of 
Occupational & Professional Licensing dated June 24, 1992 (R 34), 
indicated any concurrence by the State Board of Pharmacy, the 
appropriate board. Although the written Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order are prefaced as being 
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"By the Board" there is no signature of anyone appended thereto 
(R 35-43). In any event Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16(2)(b) states 
that: "(b) The presiding officer shall make written 
recommendations for action, findings of fact and conclusions of 
law." 
CONCLUSION 
The cause should be remanded to the Agency to eliminate the 
revocation portion of the Order. 
Dated this 6P day of November, 1992. 
Georije K. Fadel 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES 
OF JACK W. PICKETT TO 
PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST AND TO 
DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
AND THE LICENSES OF 
SERVUS DRUG CO. AS A PHARMACY 
AND AS A DISPENSARY FOR 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
CASE NO. OPL-92-6 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 24, 1992, following a hearing on a petition involving 
Jack W. Pickett and Servus Drug Co. ("Respondents") before the 
Administrative Law Judge and the State Board of Pharmacy, the 
Director of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
(the "Division") adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Recommended Order of the Board. The Order revoked Respondent 
Pickett's license to dispense controlled substances and placed his 
license as a pharmacist on probation for three years, subject to 
certain terms and conditions. Respondent was represented by an 
attorney throughout the proceeding, as well as on review. He 
requested agency review on July 1, 1992, and also was given until 
July 27, 1992, to supplement his brief requesting review. Oral 
argument was neither requested nor held. 
In his request for review, Respondent requests that the Order 
be modified so that he may continue as a licensed pharmacist. 
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STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Review is conducted pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
63-46b-12, and Rule 151-46b-12 of the Rules of Procedure for 
Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce. 
THE ISSUES REVIEWED 
1. Whether the Order contains procedural defects sufficient 
to warrant overturning it; 
2. Whether Respondent was unfairly deprived of a fair 
hearing where the Division Director was present and participated in 
questioning Respondent, thus either becoming an "advocate"1 rather 
than a "tribunal", or unduly influencing the Recommended Order; 
3. Whether the Order is not supported by the Findings of 
Fact; and 
4. Whether the Order of revocation was arbitrary and 
capricious, particularly when compared with penalties in other 
cases. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent does not contest the Findings of Fact entered 
into by the Board, and consequently they are adopted herein for 
purposes of this review. 
2. The Order found that Respondent has engaged in acts or 
conduct which violated §58-17-10 (1) (m) ; §58-17-22 (8) ; and Rule 153-
17-12. Specifically, it found that Respondent had, on twelve 
occasions, dispensed Schedule IV and Schedule III controlled 
substances, as well as a legend drug, without a physician's 
authorization, or without proper labels, to one customer. 
-2-
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Respondent apparently acknowledged that his prescriptive practices 
were improper and that he did not adequately document dispensing 
certain drugs. The Findings concluded that there was a lack of 
sufficient evidence to find that Respondent made false or forged 
prescriptions, as had been charged in the Petition. 
3. Respondent argues as grounds for review that the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order were not signed 
by the presiding officer. They were in fact not signed by either 
the Board or the Administrative Law Judge. The Order adopting the 
Findings, Conclusions and Recommended Order was signed by the 
Division Director. 
4. The Director was present at the hearing. However, the 
limited record available for review does not indicate what, if any, 
questions were put to Respondent, or any other witness, by the 
Director. No evidence or transcripts were produced by Respondent, 
or arguments made, which would enable a determination to be made as 
to whether or not the Director acted as an advocate, or whether his 
presence unduly influenced the process. 
5. Respondent does not indicate which portions of the Order 
are not supported by the Findings of Fact. 
6. Respondent supplemented the request for review by listing 
ten cases previously decided by the Division and Board against 
other pharmacists, in which the penalties were less than those in 
this case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In Respondent's request for review, he cites no statutory 
-3-
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or other authority for the proposition that the Findings, 
Conclusions and Recommended Order must be signed by the Board or 
the Administrative Law Judge. The procedure does not appear to 
violate the Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), which, at §63-
46b-10, requires that in formal proceedings, the presiding officer 
shall sign and issue the order. In this case, the order was signed 
and issued by the division director, who was the "presiding 
officer1" for purposes of overseeing the proceedings. Pursuant to 
§58-1-16(2), the director may designate a presiding officer in 
disciplinary proceedings, which shall make written recommendations, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. For purposes of 
conducting a hearing and making recommendations, the director 
designated the Board as the "presiding officer". There is no 
requirement that the recommendation be signed. The procedure 
followed herein, where the Division Director signed the final Order 
adopting the Board's recommendations was not improper. 
2. Whether the Director's presence and participation 
constituted his an "advocate" is a contention which appears to be 
without merit. As noted above, Respondent produced no evidence, 
transcripts or arguments which would assist in reviewing this 
issue. Without such a showing, the Director's participation, if 
any, cannot be deemed to have been improper in any way, nor can it 
be declared to have unduly influenced the Board's recommendations. 
Common practice is for the Board to deliberate without the presence 
of the Director; there was no evidence presented by Respondent as 
to whether or not this in fact occurred -- nor that it would be 
-4-
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improper even if it had. If the Director were not present at the 
hearing, or not asking questions, could Respondent have raised the 
argument that he was thus not qualified to judge the case? 
3. Respondent next argues that the Order is not supported by 
the findings of fact. It is difficult to evaluate Respondent's 
claim where he does not contest the findings, and provides no 
specific statements of where the findings may be deficient. The 
undisputed facts can be summarized as follows: Respondent 
dispensed dosages of a Schedule IV controlled substance, a Schedule 
III controlled substance and a legend drug, either without a 
physician's authorization, or dispensed them in unlabeled vials or 
in a paper bag with no labels or instructions. These findings 
constitute a legally sufficient basis for the Order. Section 58-
17-9 provides that the Division may suspend, revoke or restrict a 
pharmacist's license for violating the law. Further, Section 58-
17-10(1) specifically makes it a violation to dispense a 
prescription drug without a prescription, or to fail to properly 
label prescriptions. 
4. Finally, Respondent argues that the Order revoking 
Respondent's controlled substance license, and imposing a three 
year probation on this pharmacist's license, is too severe. 
Respondent points out certain factors in Respondent's favor: 
a. Pharmacy is Respondent's lifetime profession; 
b. He was adjudged to have dispensed improperly only to 
one long-time customer, who arguably had oral approval from a 
physician for the refills; 
-5-
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c. The penalty is more severe than penalties in other 
cases. 
5. Two separate penalties are at issue here. The first one, 
revocation of Respondent's controlled substance license, is 
mitigated somewhat by two factors. The Order allows Respondent to 
employ another pharmacist, under Board supervision, to establish 
controls with respect to controlled substances. Second, an 
examination of prior cases reveals that the Division and Board on 
occasion entertain requests to reinstate licenses. The second 
penalty, a three-year probation of Respondent's pharmacist license, 
was not the most harsh that the Order could have imposed; 
subsection 58-17-11 also allows the division to suspend or revoke 
a license. With probation, Respondent can continue practicing as 
a pharmacist, subject to Board supervision -- he simply cannot 
personally dispense controlled substances. 
6* Of the other Division proceedings against pharmacists 
cited by Respondent, such precedent is of limited value for several 
reasons. The cases cited are somewhat old: the most recent are 
approximately three years old; other cases are as many as six years 
old. An examination of the cases cited by Respondent, as well as 
others, yields more information not disclosed in the request for 
review. Note, for example, that the Leatherwood and Anderson 
orders, cited by Respondent, were pursuant to stipulation of the 
parties. (Also, Respondent omits to mention that Leatherwood's 
penalty actually was revocation, which was stayed in favor of 
suspension and probation) . In the Nielson case, the license of the 
-6-
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pharmacy itself, a corporation, was placed on probation, which was 
not the case in the order under review here. In other cases not 
cited by Respondent, severe sanctions were entered: for example, 
see Morrison, No. 85-63 (license indefinitely suspended by 
stipulation); Jensen, No. 86-05 (default revocation of pharmacist 
and controlled substance licenses); Evans, No. 88-20 (pharmacist 
license suspended, controlled substance license surrendered, by 
stipulation). In addition, as pointed out by counsel for Division 
in its Response to the request for review, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that a sanction is not invalid only because it is more 
severe than sanctions in other cases. Finally, where the Board, 
the Administrative Law Judge and Director were present at the 
hearing, heard the testimony and were able to observe the 
Respondent's demeanor, and found that restrictions were necessary 
to protect the public health, safety and welfare, the sanction 
should not be overturned or modified unless a compelling reason can 
be demonstrated. 
7. In support of the penalty, the Order found that: 
a. "Respondent should have known [the patient] was 
attempting to obtain drugs by either fraud or 
misrepresentation." (Recommended Order, page 6) 
b. "Respondent violated R153-17-12(2) when he prepared 
documents to purportedly reflect a physician's authorization 
for the medication which was dispensed when, in fact, no 
authorization was made." (Page 6) 
c. Respondent engaged in "unprofessional conduct", was 
-7-
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8 
"grossly negligent" (page 6); his conduct was an "egregious 
departure from those standards which govern his profession", 
and he engaged in such misconduct on "numerous occasions" 
(page 7). 
8. Respondent's request on review that the Order be modified 
so he can "continue as a licensed pharmacist" indicates an apparent 
misunderstanding of the Order. Under that order, Respondent can 
continue: his license to practice as a pharmacist is placed on 
probation and subject to various conditions, but he is not 
forbidden to practice. 
ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED THAT: 
The order is upheld in its entirety. Pursuant to Rule 151-
46b-12, the effective date of that order is ten days from the date 
that this order on review is mailed. 
Dated this 7 ^ day of July, 1992. 
David L. Buhler, Executive Director 
Department of Commerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review of this Order may be sought by filing a 
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of 
this Order. Any Petition for such Review must comply with the 
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16. 
-8-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
9 
I certify that on the ^ day of July, 1992, I caused 
to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on 
Review, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to: 
Respondent: 
Jack W. Pickett 
Servus Drug Co. 
55 North Main Street 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Attorney for Respondent: 
George K. Fadel 
170 West 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84010 
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to: 
David E. Robinson, Director 
Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
P.O Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Delia Welch, Assistant A.G. 
Beneficial Life Tower 
11th Floor 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-9-
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF 
JACK W. PICKETT 
TO PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST AND 
TO DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
AND THE LICENSES OF 
8ERVUS DRUG CO. 
AS A PHARMACY AND AS A DISPENSARY 
FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
O R D E R 
Case No. OPL-92-6 
The attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommended Order are hereby adopted by the Director of the 
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing of the State of 
Utah. Respondent Jack W. Pickett's license to dispense 
controlled substances is thus revoked, effective thirty (30) days 
from the date of this Order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the revoked license, both wall 
and wallet sizes, as well as the embossed certificate, thus be 
surrendered to the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing. 
Dated this day of June, 1992. 
David E. Robinson 
Director 
' ^ ^^^dmini^trative review of this Order may be obtained by 
filing a request for agency review with the executive director of 
the department within thirty (30) days after issuance of this 
Order. Any such request must comply with the requirements of the 
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-12(l) and R151-46b-12 of the departmental 
rules which govern agency review. 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF : 
JACK W. PICKETT : 
TO PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST AND : FINDINGS OF FACT 
TO DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND THE LICENSES OF : AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
SERVUS DRUG CO. : 
AS A PHARMACY AND AS A DISPENSARY : Case No. OPL-92-6 
FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN : 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Appearances: 
Delia M. Welch for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
George K. Fadel for Respondents 
BY THE BOARD: 
A hearing was conducted in the above-entitled matter on May 
26, 1992 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for 
the Department of Commerce, and the State Board of Pharmacy. 
Board members present for the hearing were Dennis R. White and 
Don Sterling. The remaining Board members, Frank Morris, Mark L. 
Johnson and Delbert A. Park, were absent. David E. Robinson, the 
Director of the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, was present. Respondents consented that the hearing 
be conducted as scheduled, despite the lack of a majority of 
Board members present for the hearing. Thereafter, evidence was 
offered and received. 
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The Board, being fully advised in the premises, now enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent Jack W. Pickett (hereinafter, Respondent) is, 
and at all times relevant to this proceeding has been, licensed 
to practice as a pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances 
in the State of Utah. Respondent has been a licensed pharmacist 
since approximately 1954. Respondent Servus Drug Co. 
(hereinafter, Servus Drug Co.) is, and at all time relevant to 
this proceeding has been, licensed as a pharmacy and a dispensary 
for controlled substances in the State of Utah. This record does 
not reflect the exact date those licenses were issued. 
Respondent is employed by Servus Drug Co., a business which is 
owned by Respondent's wife. 
2. On twelve occasions between May 20, 1991 and July 30, 
1991, Respondent dispensed various dosages of either Tranxene, a 
Schedule IV controlled substance, Esgic, a Schedule III 
controlled substance, or Soma, a legend drug, to a Todd Schriver. 
In certain instances, Respondent dispensed those controlled 
substances without a physician's authorization to do so. On 
occasion, Respondent dispensed medications in either unlabeld 
prescription vials or a paper bag bearing no labels or 
instructions. 
3. There is a lack of sufficient evidence Respondent made 
false or forged prescriptions as to dispense the above-stated 
controlled substances or other medications. Further, there is a 
lack of sufficient evidence to conclude Respondent knew Mr. 
2 
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Schriver was drug dependent. Respondent acknowledges his 
prescriptive practices were improper and he failed to adequately 
document the controlled substances or other medications which he 
dispensed. Respondent often dispensed those controlled 
substances or other medications in the manner requested by Mr. 
Schriver, who often suggested the use of either unlabeled vials 
or other inappropriate containers. 
4. There is no substantial evidence Respondent has 
improperly dispensed controlled substances or other medications 
to other individuals. Respondent asserts he has taken remedial 
measures to address the acknowledged deficiencies in his 
practices now under review. However, there is a lack of 
substantial evidence as to the specific nature of corrective 
measures Respondent may have undertaken in that regard. 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
Utah Code Ann. Section 58-17-9 provides the Division, in 
collaboration with the Board, may suspend, revoke or restrict the 
license of a pharmacist on one or more of the following grounds: 
(5) being found by the board to be in 
violation of this chapter or rules adopted 
under this chapter; 
(6) acts of unprofessional conduct as 
defined by statute or by rule of the 
division, in collaboration with the board, as 
follows: 
. . . . 
(g) violation of the federal 
Controlled Substance Act, the Utah 
Controlled Substance Act, or rules 
and regulations adopted under 
either of them. 
Section 58-17-10(1) provides it is unlawful for any person to: 
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(m) dispense a prescription drug to anyone 
who does not have a prescription from a 
practitioner or to anyone who he knows or 
should know is attempting to obtain drugs by 
fraud or misrepresentation. 
Section 58-17-22 further provides: 
(8) Each drug or device dispensed shall 
have a label securely affixed to the 
container indicating the following: 
(a) the name, address, and 
telephone number of the pharmacy; 
(b) the serial number; 
« . . . 
(d) the name of the patient . . 
(e) the name of the prescriber; 
(f) the directions for use and 
cautionary statements, if any, 
which are contained in the 
prescription order or are needed; 
(g) the trade, generic or 
chemical name, amount dispensed and 
strength of dosage form, but if 
multiple ingredient products with 
established proprietary or 
nonproprietary names are 
prescribed, those products7 names 
may be used. 
R153-17-12 of the rules which govern the practice of pharmacy 
further define unprofessional conduct to include: 
(1) Violating any federal or state statute 
or rule dealing with controlled substances or 
other drugs; 
(2) Fraud or deception in the practice of 
pharmacy; 
(3) Negligence or incompetence in the 
practice of pharmacy. 
With respect to a license to dispense controlled substances, 
Section 58-37-6(4)(a) provides such a license "may be suspended, 
placed on probation, or revoked" by the department upon finding 
that the licensee has: 
4 
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(vi) violated any department rule that 
reflects adversely on the licensee's 
reliability and integrity with respect to 
controlled substances; 
In addition to the acts and practices set forth in the just-
stated statute, R156-37-9 provides the Division may revoke, 
suspend, restrict or place on probation a controlled substance 
license if the licensee: 
(2) has violated any federal or state law 
relating to controlled substances; 
• • • • 
(7) violates restrictions upon controlled 
substances, prescriptions and administration 
as contained in these rules; and/or 
(8) knowingly prescribes, sells, gives 
away or administers, directly or indirectly, 
or offers to prescribe, sell, furnish, give 
away, or administer any controlled substance 
to a drug dependent person, as defined in 
Utah Code Ann., 58-37-2(14), except for 
legitimate medical purposes as permitted by 
law. 
Section 58-37-6(7)(a) provides: 
No person may write or authorize a 
prescription for a controlled substance 
unless he is: 
(i) a practitioner authorized to 
prescribe drugs and medicine under 
the laws of this state or under the 
laws of another state having 
similar standards; and 
(ii) licensed under this chapter 
or under the laws of another state 
having similar standards. 
Section 58-37-6(7)(c) further provides: 
(i) No controlled substance may be 
dispensed without the written prescription of 
a practitioner, if the written prescription 
is required by the federal Controlled 
Substances Act. 
Section 58-37-8(3)(a) also provides it is unlawful for any 
person: 
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(i) who is subject to this chapter to 
distribute or dispense a controlled substance 
in violation of this chapter; 
Finally, Section 58-37-8(4)(a) provides it is unlawful for any 
person knowingly and intentionally: 
(iii) to make any false or forged 
prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance,, or to utter the same, 
or to alter any prescription or written order 
issued or written under the terms of this 
chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent 
material information in any application, 
report, or other document required to be kept 
by this chapter or to willfully make any 
false statement in any prescription, order, 
report, or record required by this chapter; 
Respondent violated Section 58-17-10(1)(m) when he dispensed 
prescription drugs and controlled substances without any 
practitioner's authorization to do so. Under the circumstances, 
Respondent should have known Mr. Schriver was attempting to 
obtain drugs by either fraud or misrepresentation. Respondent 
failed to comply with Section 58-17-22(8) when he dispensed drugs 
in containers without appropriate labeling. Respondent violated 
R153-17-12(2) when he prepared documents to purportedly reflect a 
physician's authorization for the medication which was dispensed 
when, in fact, no authorization was made. 
Respondent also violated Section 58-37-6(7)(a) and Section 
58-37-6(7)(c)(i). By reason thereof, Respondent engaged in 
unprofessional conduct, as defined in R153-17-12(1). He was also 
grossly negligent in his practice of pharmacy, which reflects 
unprofessional conduct with respect to R153-17-12(3). However, 
there is a lack of sufficient evidence to find and thus conclude 
Respondent violated Section 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) or (iv). 
6 
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Thus, Respondent has engaged in unprofessional conduct and a 
proper basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction with respect 
to his licensure as a pharmacist and his ability to dispense 
controlled substances in this state. However, no proper basis 
exists to enter any disciplinary sanction with respect to the 
license of Servus Drug Co. as a pharmacy or a dispensary of 
controlled substances. 
Respondents misconduct represents an egregious departure 
from those standards which govern his profession. Further, 
Respondent engaged in such misconduct on numerous occasions. 
Respondent's conduct does not merely reflect a singular, 
haphazard exercise of his duties as a pharmacist. Rather, 
Respondent repeatedly failed to properly dispense controlled 
substances and other medication. Various statutes and rules 
appropriately restrict the manner in which controlled substances 
may be dispensed, yet Respondent frequently failed to comply with 
the requirements of those statutes and rules. 
Therefore, an appropriately severe sanction should enter 
with regard to Respondent's license to dispense controlled 
substances. Further, adequate restrictions must exist to 
appropriately protect the public health, safety and welfare and 
ensure Respondent continually complies with those standards which 
govern his profession. The recommended order set forth below is 
thus necessary to adequately monitor Respondent's future conduct 
as a pharmacist, to appropriately prompt necessary corrective and 
remedial action required of Respondent and to ensure controlled 
substances are dispensed in a manner consistent with the dictates 
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of state and federal law. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondent's license to dispense 
controlled substances is revoked. 
It is further ordered Respondent's license as a pharmacist 
be placed on probation for three (3) years, subject to the 
following terms and conditions: 
1. Within thirty (30) days from the date 
this Recommended Order may be adopted by the 
Director of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing, Respondent shall 
submit a written practice plan, which shall 
be subject to Board review and approval. 
Said plan shall provide for another 
pharmacist to be employed by Servus Drug Co. 
Said pharmacist shall thereafter establish 
proper record keeping, inventory control and 
dispensary procedures for controlled 
substances at the pharmacy. 
2. Respondent and the just-referenced 
pharmacist shall initially meet with the 
Board each month during the first three (3) 
months of this probationary term. 
Thereafter, Respondent and the pharmacist 
shall meet with the Board every six (6) 
months. During those meetings, the Board 
will review the ongoing efforts to implement 
proper record keeping practices, appropriate 
management of controlled substance inventory 
and proper procedures with regard to any 
controlled substances which are dispensed 
through the pharmacy in question. 
3. The Division shall periodically audit 
the controlled substance records of Servus 
Drug Co. 
4. Within ninety (90) days from the date 
this Recommended Order may be adopted, 
Respondent shall successfully complete the 
jurisprudence examination generally required 
of all pharmacists licensed to practice in 
this state. 
Should Respondent fail to comply with the terms and 
8 
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43 
conditions set forth herein, or otherwise violate any statute or 
rule which governs his license as a pharmacist, further 
proceedings shall be conducted and a determination made whether a 
sanction of greater severity than that set forth herein is 
warranted. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the ^/ day of June, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, RECOMMENDED ORDER AND ORDER was sent first 
class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jack W. Pickett 
Servus Drug 
55 North Main 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
George K. Fadel 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful Ut 84010 
C^MH itfM •r! kllfWr. 
Carol W. Inglesby * 
Administrative Assistant 
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